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THE vicarious responsibility imposed when a plaintiff recovers
damages from some one other than the actual wrongdoer has
never been quite satisfactorily explained.,. Nevertheless, the
courts have applied the conventional categories of vicarious lia-
bility to cases in which the defendant pleads the contributory
negligence of a third party. Consequently, such pleas are gen-
erally confined to situations where the plaintiff, had he been de-
fending instead of suing, would have been responsible in dam-
ages for the conduct, of the person whose contributory negligence
is alleged. In short, vicarious responsibility must work both
ways if it works at all.2
Aside from the conventional employment and agency situa-
tions, there are four recurring types of cases involving the plea
of contributory conduct of some one other than the plaintiff.
(1) The defendant pleads the conduct of a child-plaintiff's
parents. (2) Defendant pleads the conduct of a vehicle pas-
senger-plaintiff's driver. (3) Defendant pleads the conduct of
a bailor-plaintiff's bailee. (4) Defendant pleads the conduct of
a husband- or parent-plaintiff's wife or child -in an action for
loss of services. These type cases will be subsequently referred
to by number.
In case 1 a child whose extreme youth precludes its own con-
duct from being pleaded as a defense, is carelessly allowed by
its parents to become exposed to danger and is injured by the
defendant. Courts generally deny the plea of the parent's con-
duct in the child's action for damages, observing that the child
cannot be made to accept the risk of its parents' conduct be-
cause a conventional relationship of vicarious responsibility does
not exist between them.3
In case 2, plaintiff riding in a vehicle driven by another is
injured in a collision with the vehicle driven by defendant.
Unless the driver of plaintiff's car is his servant or is engaged
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago; author of Respon-
sibility of Infant for His Agents' Torts (1930) 5 Wis. L. REV. 453.
1 See Douglas, Vicariovs Liability and Administration of Risk I (1929) 38
YATE L. J. 584; Legis. (1931) 45 HARV. L. REv. 171.
2 Little v. Hackett, 116 U. S. 366, 371, 6 Sup. Ct. 391 (1886) ; New York,
L. E. & W. R. R. v. New Jersey E. Ry., 60 N. J. L. 338, 38 Atl. 828 (1897).
For brevity, this will be termed the "both ways" test.
z Warren v. Manchester St. Ry., 70 N. H. 352, 47 Atl. 735 (1900).
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in a "joint enterprise" with him, so that the plaintiff would
be responsible for his driver's conduct to any third person, the
defendant's plea of the driver's conduct is denied.- The "both
ways" test spelled the over-ruling of many older cases in which
occupants of a vehicle were simply identified with the driver and
were made to bear the risk of his driving.
Case 3 is an action by a bailor against one whose conduct,
combined with that of the bailee, caused damage to the chattel
bailed. Although the bailor was not responsible in damages
to any third person injured by the bailee's carelessness of the
bailment,6 courts until about 1900 allowed the bailee's conduct
to be pleaded as a defense to the bailor's action for damages.'
But the general approval of the "both ways" test has established
the contrary view.8 The issue in type case 3 is present in an
action by the owner or mortgagee of real property damaged
by the concurrent negligence of his lessee, life tenant or mort-
gagor and defendant., A more striking analogy is an action by
a conditional vendor'10 or chattel mortgagee whose security is
damaged by the negligence of defendant and the vendee or
mortgagor.
4 See Comment (1929) 38 YAL L. J. 810.
5 Little v. Hackett, supra note 2.
6 Herlihy v. Smith, 116 Mass. 265 (1874); of. Nash v. Lang, 268 Mass. 407,
167 N. E. 762 (1929) ; Mosby v. Kimball, 178 N. E. 66 (Ill. 1931).
7 Bethea v. Taylor, 3 Stew. 482 (Ala. 1831); Welty v. Indianapolis, & V.
Ry., 105 Ind. 55, 4 N. E. 410 (1886); Smith v. Smith, 2 Pick. 621 (Mass.
1825); Illinois Central R. R. v. Sims, 77 Miss. 325, 27 So. 527 (1899); John-
son v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 117 Mo. App. 308, 93 S. W. 866 (1906);
Forks Township v. King, 84 Pa. 230 (1877); Winner v. Oakland Township,
158 Pa. 405, 410, 27 Atl. 1110, 1111 (1893) ; T. & P. Ry. v. Tankersloy, 03
Tex. 57 (1885); Munster v. Hexter, 295 S. W. 245 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
8 This view obtains in Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois,
Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri, Now Hamp-
shire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia,
Washington, Wisconsin, in the federal courts and in England. A few
typical decisions are Nash v. Lang, supra note 6; New York, L. E. & W. R. R.
v. New Jersey E. Ry., supra note 2; Gibson v. Bessemer & L. E. R. 1., 226
Pa. 198, 75 Atl. 194 (1910); Sea Ins. Co. v. Vicksburg, S.' & P. fly., 159
Fed. 676 (C. C. A. 5th, 1908); and Wellwood v. King [1921] 2 Ir. R, 274
(K. B. Div. 1920), revd at 290 (C. A. 1921).
1) Higgins v. Los Angeles G. & E. Co,, 159 Cal. 651, 115 Pac. 313 (1911);
Boehm v. Bethlehem, 4 Pa. Super. Ct. 385 (1897) ; of. Consolidated Gas Co. v.
Getty, 96 Md. 683, 54 Atl. 660 (1903). Contra: Bartlett v. Boston G. L. Co.'
117 Mass. 533 (1875). A tenant is not barred by the landlord's contributory
negligence. Contos v. Jamison, 81 S. C. 488, 62 S. E. 867 (1908); Missouri
Pac. Ry. v. Pfrang, 7 Kan. App. 1 (1897). A present owner is not barred
by the contributory negligence of his vendor. Richmond v. Gallego Mills Co.,
102 Va. 165, 45 S. E. 877 (1903)..
20 Commercial Credit Corp. v. Satterthwaite, 150 Atl. 235 (N. J. 1930),
commented upon in (1930) 40 YALE L. J. 135. See Lacey v. Great Northern
Ry., 70 Mont. 346, 354, 225 Pac. 808, 811 (1924), 38 A. L. R. 1331, 1337
(1925) ; United Motor Finance Co. v. Quaker City Cab Co., 82 Pa. Super. Ct.
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Case 4 presents a situation analogous to the three type cases
mentioned inasmuch as the injury to the plaintiff is caused by
the concurrent conduct of the defendant and another who is
not an agent or servant of the plaintiff or engaged in a joint
enterprise with him. The defendant negligently injures a minor
child or the wife of plaintiff, who sues to recover for medical
expenditures and loss of services. Courts universally grant the
defendant's plea of the child's or wife's conduct, but they ra-
tionalize this view in a variety of ways.1
In all except the fourth of these type cases, the issue becomes
a quibble concerning the existence of one of the categorical
relationships of vicarious responsibility between the plaintiff and
the one whose conduct is pleaded as a defense. Little attempt
is made to decide these cases in accordance with the forseeable
chance of injury taken by the plaintiffs. Courts seem unaware
that the policies involved in granting or denying the defensive
plea may be different from those controlling the responsibility
in damages of a master for the conduct of his servant, and that
the latter are probably concerned simply with providing a
financially responsible defendant.
Some courts in handling case 4 have conceived elaborate and
artificial rationalizations to reconcile their decisions with the
disposition of cases 1, 2, and 3. Similar rationalizations are
suggested in some of the bailment cases decided by courts not
conforming to the general view of type case 3. The first part
of this article is a discussion and criticism of these decisions and
rationalizations. The second part attempts a critical study of
the social value of common-law rules governing vicarious con-
ributory negligence in order to demonstrate the possibilities
272 (1923) ; General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Baltimore & Ohio i. R., 97
Pa. Super. Ct. 93 (1929).
11 Chicago B. & Q. Ry. v. Honey, 63 Fed. 39 (C. C. A. 8th., 1894); Callies
v. Reliance Laundry Co., 188 Wis. 376, 206 N. W. 198 (1925). These two
cases are typical and the most important. Cases in which the same result was
reached without statement of reason or theory, or by simply basing it on
"imputed negligence" are as follows: Pratt v. Brawley, 83 Ala. 371, 3 So. 555
(1887) ; Wueppesahl v. Connecticut Co., 87 Conn. 710, 89 Atl. 166 (1913) ;
laden v. Georgia R. R., 78 Ga. 47 (1886); Kennard v. Burton, 25 Me. 39
(1845); Dietrich v. Baltimore & H. S. Ry., 58 Md. 347 (1882); Vorrath
v. Burke, 63 N. J. L. 188, 42 AtI. 838 (1899); Gilligan v. New York & H. R.
R., 1 E. D. Smith 453 (N. Y. C. P. 1852) ; Burke v. Broadway & S. A. 11. R.,
49 Barb. 529 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1867); Cleveland, C. & C. R. R. v. Terry, 8 Ohio
St. 571 (1858); Winner v. Oakland Township, sztpra note 7; Knowlton v.
Hydro-Electric P. C., 58 Ont. L. Rep. 80 (1925); McKittrick v. Byers, 58
Ont. L. Rep. 158 (App. Div. 1925).
For a good note discussing this type of case critically see Note (192G) 42
A. L. R. 717. See also Comment (1922) 31 YALE L. J. 639; (1926) 24 Mixcn.
L. REv. 592; Gilmore, Imputed Negligence '(1921) 1 Wis. L. REv. 193, 206-
215.
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of their more satisfactory administration by the adoption of
methods in vogue in some of the more liberal jurisdictions.
I
The rule that a bailee may recover against third parties for the
entire damage to the bailment is the point of departure in the
analysis of type case 3. Why he originally had an action for in-
jury to the bailor's interest as well as to his own is a matter
of speculation. 1 2 But it is now generally accepted that as against
third persons the bailee's possession entitles him to full recov-
ery.'3 The bailor has no reason to complain for he may control
recovery for his interest if he acts before the bailee receives
judgment; '4 and if he does not, it is assumed that as he en-
trusted the chattel to his bailee, he likewise entrusts the re-
covery of damages for injury to his interest in the chattel.
The defendant is protected from a subsequent action by the
bailor when the bailee has recovered full damages."' This is
based neither on res judicatai'0 nor on a theory that the bailor
has already sued by his agent,17 the bailee; it is rather because
the courts will not make a defendant pay twice for the same
default.i The bailee holds the damages "in trust" for the
bailor.19 Although many cases indicate that complete recovery
is a defense to the bailor's later action, and at least one court
has held that a settlement has the same effect,20 there is appar-
ently no decision that a judgment against the bailee would pre-
12 HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw, Lecture V, The Bailee at Common Laiu
(1881) 164 et seq.; Bordwell, Property in Chattels 11 (1916) 29 IAUtV. L.
REV. 731-751.
" The Winkfield [1902] P. D. 42; The Beaconsfield, 158 U. S. 303, 15 Sup.
Ct. 860 (1895); Herries v. Bell, 220 Mass. 243, 107 N. 1. 944 (1915).
It is said there is a tendency to confine bailee's recovery to his ovn limited
interest unless he is duly authorized by his bailor to recover full damages.
DOBE, BAILMENTS AND CARRIERS (1914) 64, 87, 134; Note (1912) 25 ItARY.
L. REV. 655. This tendency seems to have been arrested in England. ]33VMN,
NEGLIGENCE (4th ed. 1928) 909.
'4 Smith v. Willoughby, 24 N. D. 1, 138 N. W. 7 (1912); Missouri, K. & T.
Ry. v. Hunter, 216 S. W. 1107 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919).
'
5 DoBIE, op. cit. supra note 13, at 64.
26 But see Eaton v. Schild, 149 Atl. 637 (N. J. 1930).
27 But see Missouri K. & T. Ry. v. Hunter, supra note 14.
is FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) § 482 and cases cited in note 12;
see Lord, Stone & Co. v. Buchanan, 69 Vt. 320, 37 At]. 1048 (1897); Has-
brouck v. Lounsbury, 26 N. Y. 598 (1863).
29 Industrial Inv. Co. v. King, 132 So. 333 (Miss. 1931) ; cases cited in
FREEMAN, 1e. cit. supra note 18. See also Woodman v. Nottingham, 49
N. H. 387 (1870); Littlefield v. Bi.ddeford 29 Me. 310 (1849); Walsh v.
United States T. & A. Co., 153 Ill. App. 229 (1910).
20 Harris v. Seaboard A. Ry., 190 N. C. 480, 130 S. E. 319 (1925).
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elude the bailor's subsequent action.2' Even recovery by bailee
for injury to his limited interest only is no defense.22
These conclusions have an important bearing on type case
S. Suppose in the bailee's action for negligent injury to the
chattel,, the defendant successfully pleads the bailee's contribu-
tory negligence. Would the bailor's subsequent action be barred?
In Wellwood v. King 2 3 the Irish King's Bench, allowing the de-
fendant to plead the bailee's conduct in an action by the bailor
for damage to his automobile, rested its decision on the assump-
tion that if the bailee had sued first and had been defeated be-
cause of his contributory negligence, a subsequent action by the
bailor would have been barred as a matter of course. The court
thought it was anomalous and unjust that recovery "for the same
injury to the same chattel in damages enuring for the benefit
of the same person were to depend upon the quiddity whether
the bailor or bailee was the first litigant." Consequently it de-
cided to admit the plea of bailee's conduct whether he or bailor
sued first. The court's view that "the action by the bailee is
an action on behalf of the bailor," the outcome of which should
determine the rights of the bailor, would probably be rational-
ized as res judivcta or "a cause of action already adjudicated."
The validity of this rationale depends upon the meaning and
accepted application of these concepts.
An action to be res judicata, must be between the same parties
to the prior judgment.2- Successive actions by the bailee and
21 FREEN', op. cit. supra note 18, § 482; Tarleton v. Johnson, 25 Ala.
S00 (1854); Ladany v. Assad, 91 Conn. 316, 99 Atl. 762 (1917). In each
of these cases the bailor was bound by judgment against bailee in which
former action bailor was represented informally by counsel.
The only decision found by the writer that judgment against bailee is
conclusive upon bailor is Byrne v. Crooks, 2 City Court Rep. 148 (N. Y.
City Ct. 1885). This decision is on the theory that a bailee is his bailor's
agent. Cf. also headnote in Yrisarri v. Clifford, 32 N. DI. 1, 249 Pac. 1011
(1926) and Eaton v. Schild, supra note 16.
On the other hand, there are several decisions that a judgment against
bailee is not binding upon the bailor. Peck v. Mlerchant's T. & S. Co., 85
Kan. 126, 116 Pac. 365 (1911); Standard Foundry Co. v. Schloss, 43 Mo.
App. 304 (1891); see also Farmers' U. W. Co. v. Barnett, 214 Ala. 202,
107 So. 46 (1925) ; Hasbrouck v. Lounsbury, g.pra note 18; Pierce Oil Corp.
v. Taylor, 147 Ark. 100, 227 S. W. 420 (1921).
22IRogers v. Roberts, 58 M i. 519 (1882); of. Pico v. Webster, 12 Calif.
140 (1859) ; McLaughlin v. Raleigh, C. & S. Ry., 174 N. C. 182, 93 S. E.
748 (1917) ; see also STORY, BAmLIAEI's (9th ed. 1878) § 352.
25S2vpr note 8. Although the King's Bench Division readily admitted
that the bailor could not be held in damages for the bailee's negligent in-
jury to another, it thought the bailor's action for damages should neverthe-
less be barred by the bailee's contributory negligence. The Court of Appeal
reversed this decision.
24 F=AiAN, op. cit. supra note 18, § 671; Comment (1926) 35 YALE L. J.
607; von Moschzisker, Res Judicat (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 299, 302 et seq.
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bailor against the same defendant with respect to the same fact
situation for the same damages are actions between different
parties; and the view that adverse judgment suffered by an
agent or assignor is a defense to a later action by the principal
or assignee is distinguishable.
The defense of res judicata is to protect a defendant from un-
necessary litigation with respect to the same cause of action. "
If an agent sues on a cause of action belonging to his principal,
the latter is himself acting vicariously. Without the authority
his name implies, the agent has nothing to present the court
for decision; with such authority he presents on behalf of his
principal the only claim existing against the defendant. The
assignment case is similar. Only one claim exists, and whether
assignor or assignee sues on it first, the other by substitution is
concluded by the outcome. Only one party may bring an action
in either of these two situations, for allowing the other a trial
on the merits after the cause of action had once been adjudicated
is vexatious to the defendant.
The parties to a bailment, however, may bring two separate
actions for injury to their several interests. With no authority
from his bailor, the bailee may ask for damages to the interests
of both. On the other hand, he may simply ask for damages to
his limited interest. In either case, the bailee 'is uing on his
own cause of action,26 for as against everyone but his bailor he
is the owner of the damaged property. He is not, like the agent
or assignee, suing in behalf of another on the only cause of
action existing, for the bailor's cause of action is entirely dis-
tinct.
This division of interests in a bailinent suggests the contrast-
ing situation of splitting a cause of action, a typical case for
the application of res judicat. If B injures A's person and
property in the same act, A must recover both elements of
25 FrnEMAN, op. cit. supra note 18, § 626; von Moschzisker, op. cit. supra
note 24, at 299 et seq. The accuracy of this proposition depends upon the
meaning of "cause of action". If X by the same negligent acts simultane-
ously harms A's person and automobile, has A one cause of action or has he
two, one for personal injuries and another for property damage? The view
here taken is that there is but a single cause of action consisting of two
claims, the cause of action being either the fact transaction giving rise to a
claim and remedy to one person or the claim or right itself to recover. See
CLARK, CODE PLWZING (1928) 319-324 and cases cited. For a practical
point of view on this question see a comment by Professor E. W. Hinton in
(1927) 21 IrL. L. Ra. 506, in which the policies behind the proper applica-
tion of the concept res judicata and their relevance or irrelevance to the
term cause of action is analytically discussed. See a comprehensive discus-
sion of the relation of res judicata to the concept of cause of action in
(1931) 16 CORN. L. Q. 590.
26 Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. Hunter, supra note 14; Pierce Oil Corp. v.
Taylor, supra note 21.
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damage if at all in one action. A judgment in his claim for
injury to property is a bar to a later action for personal in-
juries.17 If his assignee for property damage recovers judg-
ment, A's subsequent action for personal injuries is barred 3
According to legal theory, there is only one cause of action in
these cases and B should be sued only once. If the claims are
litigated separately, judgment in the first spells the limit of B's
liability. It was not necessary to split the cause of action!:9
and in doing so A has made B liable to needless and vexatious
litigation. If the combined right to recover for injuries to the
bailor's and bailee's interests in a damaged chattel were the
cause of action, consisting of two claims for injury to two sepa-
rate interests, which cause of action the bailee may litigate in
his own right, his action for damage to his limited interest alone
ought to justify a plea of res judicato, in the bailor's subsequent
action, on the ground that litigation of part of a split cause of
action finally adjudicates the whole cause of action. That this
argument has been attempted without success indicates that
favorable or adverse judgment in bailee's suit is not res judicata
on his bailor's subsequent action.30
Adjudication of the bailee's action for complete damages
should not justify a plea of res jztlicata, in his bailor's later suit
on the theory that since the bailor should know his bailee may
sue for and recover full damages, he has impliedly appointed
his bailee agent or assignee for the purpose of suing. Far from
implying an agency between them, the contract of bailment
seems to emphasize an exclusion and separation of interests. It
does not "identify" bailor and bailee any more than a contract
of marriage identifies husband and wife.
This discussion of res judicata in type case 3 seems equally
applicable to the analogous situations of leases of and life estates
in real property, 3' and conditional sales 2 and mortgages of
27 Comment (1927) 21 ILL. L. REV. 506, supra note 25.
28Ibid.
29 Ibid. Professor Hinton observes that in some cases it is necessary to
separate the claims for personal injuries and property damage to A. As
examples, he cites the cases where A must assign his claim for property
damage to an insurance company as a condition precedent to collecting
property insurance, and where A's trustee in bankruptcy takes his claim
for property damage as an asset of the estate, although he may not take
A's claim for personal injuries. In such cases, it seems, it is better to
recognize after the assignment two causes of action accruing to two differ-
ent parties than to regard it as a single cause of action split into two claims,
litigation of either one of which would create a defense under the plea of
Tes judicata to the other action.
30 Pierce Ol Corporation v. Taylor, supra note 21.
31 FPmEAN, op. cit. supra note 18, § 483; Wood v. Griffin, 46 N. H. 280
(1865); California Dry-Dock Co. v. Armstrong, 17 Fed. 216 (C. C. D. Calif.
1883); and Bedingfield v. Onslow, 3 Lev. 209 (1685) (life tenant, though
1932]
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both real and personal property. It should not be inferred,
however, that after the bailee, conditional vendee, lessee or
mortgagor is defeated owing to his contributory negligence, the
bailor, vendor, lessor or mortgagee may then recover for com-
plete damages,* simply because he is not barred from suing by a
plea of res judicata. For if such contributory negligence is
established in the later action, the plaintiff may recover only for
damage to his own interest.33
A discussion of res judicata involves the concepts of "one
cause of action" and "derivative action". In the rationales of
type case 4 which are expressed in terms of "one cause of action"
and "derivative action", the concept of res judicato is noticeably
absent. On the same concepts employed in the discussion of
bailment cases an entirely different theory of decision is built.
The plaintiff in Honey v. Chicago, B. & Q. RyA4 sued for loss
of services of his wife and for medical expenses. The district
court denied the plea of the wife's contributory negligence, but
was reversed on this issue. The appellate court thought that
since plaintiff had a right to control his wife's movements but
permitted her to come and go as she wished, he should bear the
risk of her carelessness in failing to protedt her ability to serve
him. There was also an intimation of the theory denied by
Judge Shiras, of the district court, that plaintiff's right of action
was derived from his wife's and that he could exercise no greater
claim as an "assignee" of her right of action than she could. If
responsible to remainderman for waste, cannot hold third party for damage
to remainder unless he himself had first reimbursed remaindorman). But
see Willey v. Laraway, 64 Vt. 559, 25 Atl. 436 (1892) ; Rockwood v. Robin-
son, 159 Mass. 406, 34 N. E. 521 (1893); Anthony v. New York, P. & B. R.
R., 162 Mass. 60, 37 N. E. 780 (1894); Moeckel v. Cross & Co., 190 Mass.
280, 76 N. E. 447 (1906).
The most authoritative recent case is Rogers v. Atlantic, G. & P. Co.,
213 N. Y. 246, 107 N. E. 661 (1915), where the court held defendant liable
to life tenant for complete damages by analogy to the bailment cases, recog-
nizing that life tenant was not liable over to the remainderman. This re-
covery, the court said, would bar the remainderman's later action, not on
any theory of es judicata, but rather because courts will not make defend-
ant pay twice for the same tort.
32 Carolina, C. & 0. R. R. v. Unaka S. L. Co., 130 Tenn. 354, 170 S. V.
591 (1914); Stotts v. Puget Sound T. L. & P. Co., 94 Wash. 339, 162 Pac.
519 (1917). In the latter case the court said, comparing the instant case to
a bailment case: "We think the analogy is complete." It then said that
the vendor's later action was barred either by vendee's recovery or by
estoppel, since vendor testified in vendee's action. In view of the bailment
analogy, the latter reason would seem questionable. See also Smith v.
Guiford, 36 Fla. 481, 18 So. 717 (1895).
33 General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., supra
note 10.
34 Honey v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry., 59 Fed. 423 (S. D. Iowa 1893) ; Chi-
cago B. & Q. Ry. v. Honey, supra note 11.
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his right of action really were derivative, it must have belonged
to his wife originally. But she could not have recovered for loss
of services even if she were free from contributory negligence;
nor could she under any circumstances release or assign such a
claim.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in Callies v. Rclkiace Lcauzdry
Canpany,35 developed the theory denied by Judge Shiras in the
Haey case to its logical conclusion.s" The plaintiff's action was
for loss of her son's services and for incidental expenditures.
The court allowed defendant to plead her son's contributory
negligence. The Wisconsin court would not justify its decision
by "imputing" the child's negligence to its parent, since he was
not her servant. They preferred to say that the whole right of
recovery for personal injuries and for loss of services accrued to
the child, the latter portion of which "the law" assigned to the
parent in return for her duty of care and support. "In return
for the performance of such obligation the law gives to the
parent the right to a part of the child's cause of action in case
he is negligently injured by another." But the parent is in no
better position than any assignee of a claim subject to a defense
against the assignor. "If the minor is guilty of contributory
negligence neither minor nor parent can recover, for their rights
spring out of the same transaction-the same cause of action." 3
Young Callies had previously sued the laundry company for
personal injuries and had lost because of his contributory negli-
gence.38 If the Wisconsin court really thought that there was
but one cause of action involved, it could more simply have dis-
missed Mrs. Callies' action as res jud~icata. This easy way out
was closed, however, by a previous decision in Selleck v. Ja?zes-
ville.30 There a husband, suing for loss of his wife's services,
tried to establish the defendant's negligence by his wife's re-
covery in her prior and separate action for personal injuries.
The court held, in accordance with the general view, that two
distinct causes of action were involved and that judgment in the
wife's separate action was not res juidivto, on the husband's. "Ajudgment is conclusive only between parties and privies. The
husband was, of course, not a party. His wife sued alone. Nor
is there any privity between him and his wife as to his now
asserted demand. The cause of action is not one which once be-
longed to her and has been transferred or transmitted to him." 41
35 Supra note 11.36 For an interesting discussion of this question, antedating the Callies
case, see Gilmore, loc cit. supra note 11.
37 Callies v. Reliance Laundry Co., supra note 11.
38 Callies v. Reliance Laundry Co., 182 Wis. 53, 193 N. W. 975 (1923).
39 104 Wis. 570, 80 N. W. 944 (1899).
10 Ibid. 573, 80 N. W. at 945. Compare Craley v. La Crosse C. Ry., 10G
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This is not much like the court's later language in the Callie
case. The Selleck case represents an established view and the
issue is the same whether the action is for loss of a wife's or a
child's services.-
It is apparent that "cause of action" means something differ-
ent to the Wisconsin court in the Selleck and Callies cases. The
liberal interpretation of this concept in the latter case relieves
the court of an embarrassing discussion of res judicata. It offers
no precedent, however, to support its interpretation. The most
liberal interpretation of this concept is expressed by Dean Clark
with respect t6 the code cause of action.42 He describes it as the
aggregate of facts giving rise to a remedy at law, the extent of
the cause of action being limited by trial convenience. He would
say of the Callies case that since the remedies of the child and
parent arose out of substantially the same fact transaction, re-
quiring the same witnesses and trial of the same issues, they
may sue together stating a single cause of action. Thus where X
collides with A's car, injuring A and his guest, B, A and B may
sue together stating a single cause of action. But in neither case
would he say that the plaintiffs must join and state a single
cause of action as a condition to complete recovery.4 If they
bring separate actions or allege separate causes of action as joint
plaintiffs, they have done nothing to which he would object.
Judgment in A's action will not bar B's action, since the defense
of res judicata is proper only between parties to the prior action
or their privies. Dean Clark simply contends that under the
codes A and B should be permitted to recover as joint plaintiffs
stating a single cause of action and should not be penalized for
doing so unless their separate claims arose out of substantially
different fact transactions. This conception of "cause of action"
affords no support to the decision in the Callies case, where the
plaintiff was penalized simply because her claim arose out of
substantially the same fact transaction giving rise to the claim
of another person.
The Wisconsin court's view of a "cause of action" is without
precedent or support. It is wholly at, variance with its own
Wis. 239, 82 N. W. 197 (1898), where the court denies the applicability of
res judicata and employs stare decisis.
41 Laskowski v. People's Ice Co., 203 Mich. 186, 168 N. W. 940 (1918);
Womach v. St. Joseph, 201 Mo. 467, 100 S. W. 443 (1907); see Note (1930)
5 Wis. L. REv. 368, especially the principal case there discussed, Priester v.
Southern Ry., 151 S. C. 433, 149 S. E. 226 (1928).
42CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928) 75-87.
4sIbid. 324, which reads, in part: "The rule of joinder of partieg and of
splitting is not inconsistent, however, for, under all rules of rea judicata and
of another action pending, not only must the cause be the same, but the partice




meaning of the phrase as expressed in the prior case of Sellec1
v. JanesviUe. Both this and the Callies case were actions for
loss of services, and in both cases the phrase "cause of action"
was given contradictory meanings to serve different purposes.
It is believed that the term "cause of action" should not have
an absolute meaning but rather that it should receive the prac-
tical interpretation and application suited to the most convenient
trial of lawsuits. But its artificial and assumed interpretation
as a means of reconciling decisions "on principle" is objection-
able. It is unfortunate that the court, inasmuch as it wrote an
opinion, did not frankly declare its motive for allowing the
defense in this particular type of case.
II
Whether the defendant's plea in these situations should be
allowed or denied as a matter of social policy ought to be dis-
cussed with respect to the defense of contributory negligence in
general, first, as this defense is administered under the tradi-
tional views of the common law, and second, as it is administered
under a modern and more liberal view. This discussion of policy
raises questions of value judgments to which there can be no
correct and final answer. Nevertheless it is conducted on this
plane with the hope that the most feasible suggestions will be
the most persuasive.
The policies of allowing or denying the plea in type cases 1
(child-plaintiff) and 2 (passenger-plaintiff) have been ably
treated elsewhere.-" It may be added that under the traditional
administration of contributory negligence the circumstances
seem insufficient to justify defendant's complete immunity from
paying damages in these two type cases. The conclusion is not
so obvious in type case 3 (bailor-plaintiff). This is not, strictly
speaking, a type case, although it is usually so regarded. The
term "bailment" has a fairly definite meaning when used to
describe the property interests of two people in a single chattel;
but it is a mistake to give it a fixed meaning for the purpose of
allocating risks of loss in negligence cases. Renting out an
automobile for normal use, leaving it for repair or storing it
are bailments accompanied by the usual division of interests and
rights as between bailor and bailee and third persons interfering
with the bailment. But the expectability of harm to the chattel
bailed, due to the contributory conduct of the bailee in dealing
with the chattel according to the terms of the bailment, grows
progressively less in these three cases.
The courts, however, do not seem to regard the risk of prob-
44 See, for example, Gilmore, op. cit. supra note 11, at 193, 257.
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able injury taken by the bailor as controlling in case 3."1 The
basis of decision is rather that the bailor is not responsible in
damages to third persons injured by the, bailee's careless use of
the chattel, or, as often expressed, the bailee is not his bailor's
servant or agent. But exceptions to this basic assumption have
accompanied the widespread use of automobiles. Several states
have enacted statutes making the bailor of an automobile respon-
sible for the careless driving of his bailee.4" Another exception
is the "family automobile doctrine", 41 under which the head of a
family who permits his wife or child to drive his car must an-
swer in damages for their careless driving. This doctrine reflects
in a particular class of bailments the social policy found in the
statutes just mentioned and, indeed, it has been adopted by
legislation. 4 This vicarious responsibility is rationalized by
calling the wife or child a servant or agent; but its real justifi-
cation is stated as the risk properly attached to entrusting to
another an instrumentality so likely to cause harm.40 Indeed, a
-5 It is probable, however, that this was the explanation for the original
view that a bailor could not recover because of his bailee's contributory negli-
gence. Sed cases cited supra note 7.
46 CAL. CIrV. CODE (Deering, 1931) § 17141/4 (by consent); CONN. GEN.
STAT. (1930) § 1627 (renting or leasing) I IoWA CODE (1931) § 5026 (by
consent); ME. REV. STAT. (1930) c. 29, §§ 35, 99 (by consent to minors and
leasing to others); MICH. Comi. LAws (1929) § 4648 and annotation (by
consent); N. Y. Laws 1929 c. 54, § 59 (former Highway Law § 282-o) (by
consent); R. I. Acts and Resolves 1927, c. 1040, § 3 (consent, driver
"deemed to be agent of the owner," etc.) ; S. C., CIV. CODE: (1922) § 5706
(claim against the owner's or bailer's automobile by lien of attachment
except when driver steals car under certain circumstances). And see Aniz.
CODE (Struckmeyer, 1928) § 1671 (bailment or furnishing to minor under
18) ; Del. Laws 1929, c. 10, § 72 (same as Arizona); Idaho Laws 1929, e. 274,
§ 1 (bailing, giving or furnishing to minor under 16); PA. STAT. ANN.
(Purdon, 1930) tit. 75, § 211 (same as Idaho). See also Mass. Acts, 1928, c.
317, § I (driver prima, facie agent of owner under any circumstances) and
Bruce v. Hanks, 178 N. E. 728 (Mass. 1931), interpreting it.
As to leases of railroad property see Mo. REV. STAT. (1929) § 4689 and
Shaffer v. Rock 1. & P. Ry., 300 Mo. 477, 254 S. W. 257 (1923); and as to
bailments of airplanes, section 5 of the Uniform Aeronautics Acts. These
statutes have been liberally construed. See Legis. (1931) 45 HARV. L, RD V.
171, and cases and excellent note in (1929) 61 A. L. R. 866.
In Hedge Drive-it-yourself Co. v. Cincinnati, 52 Sup. Ct. 144 (U. S. 1932),
the Supreme Court upheld an ordinance which, although it does not make a
bailor liable for the negligence of his bailee, requires bailer to insure or put
up bond against the negligent driving of bailees for hire.
47 Lattin, Vicarious Liability and the Family Automobile (1928) 26 MicOi.
L. REv. 846; Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases II (1929) 29
COL. L. REV. 255, 277-279, n. 67; and (1923) 7 MINN. L. REV. 353.
48 MIcH. ComoP. LAws (1929) § 4648. This statute requires consent to the
bailment, but provides that consent shall be presumed if the driver Is a
member of owner's immediate family. This statute was held constitutional
in Bowerman v. Sheehan, 242 Mich. 95, 219 N. W. 69 (1928).
49 Lattin, op. cit. supra note 47, at 865-868.
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third exceptional case, in which a corporation was held respon-
sible in damages for the negligent driving of its automobile by
an employee acting outside the scope of his employment, em-
phasized this factor as the proper basis of liability.rO
Vicarious responsibility is attached in these exceptional cases
only to bailment of an automobile for normal use and then ob-
viously to provide a financially responsible bearer of the hazard
created by putting an automobile on the highway. In jurisdic-
tions imposing statutory liability courts have allowed the defend-
ant, in an action by the bailor for damages to his car, to plead
the bailee's contributory conduct as a defense. 1 Courts approv-
ing the second and third instances of exceptional liability just
noted, will probably adopt a similar view. This view is simply
a mechanical application of the "both ways" test, and aside from
any question of its desirability it unfortunately strengthens the
conviction that the defense is permissible only where the bailor
would be liable in damages for an injury to a third person due
to the bailee's negligent use of the car.
It is believed that allowing or denying the defense of the bail-
ee's contributory negligence in case 3 should not depend simply
upon the bailor's liability for or immunity from damages to a
third person injured by the bailee's negligence. It is a wholly
independent problem.52 Aside from the cases in which courts
have taken this view,13 a few examples should indicate that en-
tirely different risks are involved in the two situations. A con-
ditional vendor is not liable under statutes making the owner of
an automobile responsible in damages for the consequences of
its negligent use by one driving it with his consent.54 Any other
result would seem shocking, unless the sale itself, under the cir-
50 Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 86 So. 629 (1920).
See Lattin, op. cit. supra note 47, at 865-868.
51 Secured Finance Co. v. Chicago, 1. L & P. Ry., 207 Iowa 1105, 224 N. W.
88 (1929) ; Swartout v. Van Auken, 132 Misc. 89, 228 N. Y. Supp. 671 (Sup.
Ct. 1928) ; Shuler v. 'hitmore, 138 Misc. 814, 246 N. Y. Supp. 528 (Sup.
Ct. 1930). But see Gochee v. Wagner, 232 App. Div. 401, 250 N. Y. Supp.
102 (4th Dep't 1931), rev'd, on a theory of control by plaintiff owner's pres-
ence, 257 N. Y. 344, 178 N. E. 553 (1931). See (1931) 17 CoNs. L. Q. 153.
52 See (1931) 17 CoRN. L. Q. 158.
Sa See cases supra note 7.
54 Lennon v. L. A. W. Acceptance Corp., 48 R. 1. 363, 138 AtM 215 (1927);
Thompson v. Morgan, 224 App. Div. 691, 228 N. Y. Supp. 670 (4th Dcp't
1928). The court deciding this New York case was construing section 282-e
of the New York Highway Law which has since been replaced by N. Y.
Laws 1929, c. 54, § 59, which provides that a conditional vendor or his as-
signee is not an owner within section 282-e. For a liberal interpretation
of this new provision, see Arcara v. Moresse, 258 N. Y. 211, 179 N. E. 389
(1932). Similar provisions occur in CAL. CIV. CODE (Deering, 1931) §




cumstances, was negligent. The conditional vendor simply
retains title as security for the price of the car. The chances of
injury to their respective interests taken by the bailor and a
conditional vendor of automobiles, however, are identical. Fore-
seeability of the same hazards of traffic and of the same prob-
ability of the* driver's carelessness in dealing with these hazards
are present in each case. Suppose the bailment is for carriage.
It is inconceivable that the bailor should be liable in damages for
an injury to another caused by the negligent carrying of the
chattel. Yet some of our courts have allowed the defense of the
carrier's contributory negligence in actions by the bailor against
third party defendants.s It is true that these decisions were
rationalized by calling the carrier the bailor's "agent"; but they
are defensible on the ground that the bailor assumed the risk
of obvious traffic hazards when he entrusted the goods to the
carrier. The same argument applies, less pointedly perhaps, to
the bailment of any harmless chattel. The probability of damage
to it through the carelessness of the bailee is apparent; the likeli-
hood of injury to a third person through carelessness in the
bailment is insignificant.
With respect to the chances of damage taken by an owner of a
chattel who puts it under the control of another, there is no
difference between an ordinary bailment and entrusting posses-
sion to an employee. That a master has more control over his
servant than a bailor has over his bailee is irrelevant, since it
is unlikely that either has any actual control when the accident
occurs. The bailor, however, stands in a much better position
to recover against a third party, for his bailee's contributory
negligence is no defense. Suppose the chattel is an automobile
which the owner hands over for normal use. The master must
bear the risk of his servant's careless driving, whether he is sued
for damages or is trying to recover for harm to the car. The
bailor bears the risk in neither case, unless a statute places on
him liability in damages to third persons injured by the bailee's
careless driving. Such divergent consequences of almost identi-
cal situations is surprising. But it is doubtful whether the situ-
ation would be improved by deciding that any owner of an
interest in a chattel who entrusts it to another's care should bear
the risk of the possessor's carelessness. As long as contributory
negligence means complete immunity for the defendant, courts
will probably not place the risk of the possessor's conduct on the
owner in these cases unless the owner, were he defendant, would
be liable in damages to a third person injured by the possessor's
5 Arctic Fire Ins. Co. v. Austin, 69 N. Y. 470 (1877). This dectlon and
its language was approved in Spelman v. Delano, 177 Mo. App. 28, 163 S.
W. 300 (1914), but was deplored in Bower v. Union Pac. R. R., 106 Kana.
404, 188 Pac. 420 (1920).
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careless use of the chattel2 6
In type case 4, an action by a husband or parent for loss of his
wife's or child's services, the contributory conduct of the latter
is a defense, although no master-servant relation exists. The
Circuit Court of Appeals in Chicago B. & Q. Ry. v. Honey con-
sidered the issues in this case and the bailment situation iden-
tical. At that time the defense of bailee's conduct was generally
allowed and the court could "conceive no greater reason" for
allowing the defense offered than that the plaintiff, were he
suing for damage to a horse and carriage he had let her drive,
would be precluded from recovering by her contributory negli-
gence. This view was further explained by the observation that
the husband has permitted his wife and the bailor his bailee to
control their own movements, in each case with the plaintiff's
interest in their power. The Wisconsin court in Callies v. Re-
liac~e Laundry Company refused to endorse this reasoning.
Another possible explanation for the general view in these
cases is a reluctance to protect the particular interest of the
plaintiff. It is not as objective as the interest in the bailment
cases but it has been recognized for centuries and is, indeed,
often referred to" as "property." - Married women's statutes
may have affected the husband's interest in his wife's services,S3
but these would be equally effective where the wife is free from
contributory negligence. In any event, such legislation does not
affect a parent's interest in his child's services.
Whether the defense is allowed or denied in type case 3 and 4
and in analogous situations, the result is not satisfactory under
the traditional principles of contributory negligence. Two com-
mon-law prejudices hamper their most effective disposition: a
reluctance to grant contribution between joint and concurrent
tortfeasors; and a tradition of placing the entire loss on plaintiff
or defendant, instead of allocating it in proportion to their
respective faults.
A rule which denies an accounting between highwaymen - or
contribution from an accomplice to a cheat who has been made
to pay damages for defrauding the plaintiff has no place in negli-
gence cases. On the other hand, contribution between jointly
= The "both ways" test, referred to in note 2, supra.
Frazier v. Georgia R. R., 101 Ga. 70, 75, 28 S. E. 684. (1897) ; Tidd N.
Skinner, 225 N. Y. 422, 433, 122 N. E. 247 (1919). See (1912) 26 1HRV. L.
REV. 74; (1926) 24 MicH. L. REv. 592. But see Wilson v. Grace, 273 Blass.
146, 173 N. E. 524 (1930) ; Bruce v. Hanks, supra note 46.
;s Feneff v. New York C. & H. R. R., 203 Mass. 278, 89 N. E. 436 (1909);
Bolger v. Boston El. Ry., 205 Mlass. 420, 91 N. E. 389 (1910); see also
Marri v. Stamford St. R. R., 84 Conn. 9, 78 Atl. 582 (1911).
59 Everet v. Williams (The Highwayman's Case, circa 1725) of which no
official report exists. It is fully reported in (1893) 9 L. Q. REv. 197 and in
LINDL=Y, PARTNERSHIP (9th ed. 1924) 124, n. a.
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responsible defendants would achieve a fairer distribution of the
loss occasioned by their negligence. Although several jurisdic-
tions allow contribution in negligence cases either by common
law 60 or by statute,6 1 it is more generally denied. 2 And in many
of the states permitting contribution at all, it is carefully re-
stricted not only to liability for negligence but to cases in which
the quality of the paying defendant's negligence is thought to be
milder than that of the contributing defendant.0 3
Where contribution is permitted, however, it is not always
effected. Some jurisdictions permit the defendant against whom
alone the plaintiff brought suit and recovered, to bring a sep-
arate action for contribution, raising for the first time the issue
of such defendant's negligence to the original plaintiff."' But
other jurisdictions require the common liability to be reduced
to a joint judgment before the paying defendant may have con-
tribution.0 5 If the plaintiff elects to sue only one of the avail-
60 Ellis v. Chicago & N. Ry., 167 Wis. 392, 167 N. W. 1048 (1918); Wait v.
Pierce, 191 Wis. 202, 209 N. "W. 475, 210 N. W. 822 (1926); Goldman v.
Mitchell-Fletcher Co., 292 Pa. 354, 141 Atl. 231 (1928); see Reath, Contribu-
tion between Persons jointly charged for Negligence-Morrywcathcr v'.
Nixan (1898) 12 HARV. L. REV. 176; Note (1911) 11 CoL. L, REV. 665, For
the most recent and an authoritative discussion see Note (1931) 45 HARV.
L. REV. 349.
,a GA. CODE (1926) § 4513 (among joint "trespassers" and against whom
plaintiff secured judgment); KY. STAT. (Carroll's, 1930) § 484a (negligence
cases involving no moral turpitude); MD. ANN. CODE (Blagby, 1924) art, 101,
§ 58 (employee injured by employer and a third person jointly; see
Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Variety I. & S. Co., 139 Md. 313, 115 Atl. 59 (1921));
MD. ANN. CODE (Bagby Supp. 1929) art. 50, § 12A (in action exe delicto
among judgment debtors of plaintiff); MICH. Comsr. LAws (1929) §§ 14497,
14475 (among parties to non-malicious joint libel); MO. REV. STAT. (1929)
§ 3268 (among defendants to judgment in all tort cases); N. Y. C. P. A. 1931
§ 211-a (among all joint tortfeasors who suffer joint judgment for injury to
person and property); N. M. Stat. 1929, 76-101 (among defendants to
judgment in all tort cases); N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) § 618 (all
tort cases, with some interesting provisions for enforcement); TVx. ANN.
REV. CIv. Stat. (Vernon, 1925) c. 9, art. 2212 (among judgment debtors in
all tort cases) ; VA. CODE (1930) § 5779 (negligence cases involving no "moral
turpitude"); W. VA. CODE (1931) c. 55 art. 7, § 13 (among parties to joint
judgment in action ex delicto); ONT. STAT. 20 GEo. V. c. 27, § 3 (1930),
quoted in note 76, infra. See generally on statutory attempts to enact such
contribution, Legis. (1931) 45 HARv. L. REV. 369.
ID Royal Indemnity Co. v. Becker, 122 Ohio St. 582, 173 N. E. 194 (1930);
National Surety Co. v. Massachusetts Bonding Co., 19 F. (2d) 448 (C. C. A.
2d, 1927); Portland v. Citizens Tel. Co., 206 Mich. 632, 173 N. W. 382 (1919).
But see (1921) 5 MINN. L. REV. 370.
6 See Note (1931) 45 HARV. L. REV. 349.
64 See statutes cited supra note 61, and Duluth M. & N. Ry. v. McCarthy,
236 N. W. 766 (Minn. 1931).
65 N. Y. statute, supra note 61; Grant v. Asmuth, 195 Wis. 458, 218 N. W.
834 (1928) ; Michel v. McKenna, 199 Wis. 608, 227 N. W. 396 (1929) ; Zuttor
v. O'Connell, 200 Wis. 601, 229 N. W. 74 (1930).
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able tortfeasors, this defendant may be unable to secure con-
tribution. In several states requiring joint liability to the plain-
tiff, before contribution is allowed,," the sole defendant may join
the other tortfeasor as a co-defendant, making him a party to the
joint judgment and, in some cases, securing an adjudication of
contribution in the same action." But in jurisdictions making
contribution conditional on common liability or joint judgment
the most liberal devices fail when some domestic relationship
between them prevents the co-defendant's tort liability to the
plaintiff."
Contribution between co-defendants generally results in an
arbitrary and equal division of loss, regardless of the compara-
tive seriousness of their respective carelessness. It has no appli-
cation, moreover, where the concurrently negligent tortfeasors
are plaintiff and defendant. In such a case the common law
places the entire loss on one party or the other instead of dis-
tributing it equally or in proportion to the seriousness of their
respective defaults. The admiralty view has always been dif-
ferent,, 9 the loss being equally shared 0 Most courts, however,
refuse to compare "negligences", 7' preferring to leave the loss
where it occurs whenever the plaintiff has contributed to it. In
many jurisdictions, however, the plaintiff may recover full dam-
ages if he is only "negligent" and defendant is "grossly negli-
- Wis. STAT. (1929) § 260.19, and Ellis v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., supra
note 60; Wait v. Pierce, szipra note 60; Mitchell v. Raymond, 181 Wis. 591,
195 N. W. 855 (1923), and Scharine v. Heubsch, 203 Wis. 261, 234 N. W. 358
(1931). For other provisions of this ldnd, see BID. ANN. CODE (Bagby, 1924)
art. 16, § 196 and (Bagby Supp. 1929) art 50, § 12A; MxCH. COMP. LAWS
(1929) § 14475; N. Y. C. P. A. 1931, § 193 sub. 2, and Haines v. Bero E. C.
Corp., 230 App. Div. 332, 243 N. Y. Supp. 657 (4th Dep't 1930) ; N. C. CODE
(Michie, 1931) § 618; Lottinan v. Culla, 288 S. W. 123 (Tex. Comm. App.
1926), discussed in (1928) 6 Tnx. L. REv. 554. On the subject generally see
(1923) 1 TEx. L. Ruv. 454; ONT. STAT. 20 GEO. V, c. 27 § 6 (1930). Compare
CAT_ Civ. CODE (Deering, 1931) § 17141, sub. wom. Subrogation. The New
York provision was recently held inapplicable. Fox v. Western N. Y. M. L.,
Inc., 257 N. Y. 305, 178 N. E. 289 (1931). As to the New York statutes see
(1931) 16 CORN. L. Q. 246, 400, 598.
- For the most liberal case of this kind, see Scharine v. Heubseb, suppr7a
note 66.
cs Ackerson v. Kibler, 138 Misc. 695, 246 N. Y. Supp. 5S0 (Sup. Ct.
1931). Contra: Wait v. Pierce, supra note 60. Cf. Zutter v. O'Connell, supra
note 65.
69 SALMOND, TORTS (7th ed. 1928) 55. See Cayzer, Irvine & Co. v. Carron
Co., 9 App. Cas. 873, 881 (H. L. 1884), and The Cairnbahn [1914] P. D. 23.
7o Huger, The Proportional Damage Rule in Collisions at Sca (1928) 13
CORN. L. Q. 531; and Robinson, Legal Adjustnuts of Pcrsonal Injury in, the
Maritime Industry (1930) 44 HARv. L. REv. 223.
71 Compare Galena & C. U. R. R. v. Jacobs, 20 Ill. 478, 490 (1358), with
Lanark v. Dougherty, 153 fI. 163, 165, 38 N. E. 892 (1894). See 20 R. C. L.
Negligence, § 119.
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gent." 72 Some courts, believing that this terminology implies a
comparison of negligences, prefer to label defendant's conduct
"recklessness" or "wilful indifference", a sort of constructive in-
tent.73  Courts employing the various refinements of the "last
clear chance doctrine" 71 carefully instruct the jury under what
particular circumstances an admittedly negligent plaintiff may
recover against a negligent defendant. One of these refinements,
the so-called "humanitarian doctrine," '" virtually instructs the
jury to do the right thing by the plaintiff. These devices are all
intended to relieve a careless plaintiff from the usual effect of
contributory negligence. They are, in practical effect, catego-
ries of comparative negligence, without the equitable feature of
sharing the loss.
It is strange that the difference between the complete liability
and the complete immunity of a defendant should depend on the
niceties employed in administering these devices before a jiiry.
A general verdict for plaintiff does not indicate that the jury
72 The term "gross negligence" is not generally favored. In Wilson v.
'Brett, 11 M. & W. 113, 115 (Exch. 1843) Rolfe, B., observed that he "could
see no difference between negligence and gross negligence--that it was the
same thing, with the addition of a vituperative epithet." Many American
jurisdictions, however, still employ this device to allow a plaintiff to evade
the defense of contributory negligence. Birmingham R. & B. Co. v. Bowers,
110 Ala. 328, 20 So. 345 (1895) ; Alger v. Duluth-Superior T. Co., 93 Minn.
314, 101 N. W. 298 (1904) ; Astin v. Chicago, M. & St. P. By., 143 Wis. 477,
128 N. W. 265 (1910). Compare Davis v. McCree, 299 Fed. 142 (0. C. A. 6tl1,
1924), with Dierickx v. Davis, 80 Ind. App. 71 (1922), two cases arising out
of the same accident but taking opposite views.
73In Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Baker, 79 Kan. 183, 98 Pac. 804 (1908),
the court disapproved the use of the terms "gross negligence" and "wanton
negligence" but was perfectly willing to permit the conduct referred to in
evidence for the purpose of letting plaintiff evade the defense of contributory
negligence by showing "wilfulness" or "implied intent," to which contribu-
tory negligence is no defense. Steinmetz v. Kelly, 72 Ind. 442 (1880). See
(1929) 5 WXis. L. BEv. 184.
74 For a complete discussion of this doctrine see a note by Professor BohlIA
in (1917) 66 U. OF PA. L. BEV. 73, and STUDIES IN Tomrs (1926) 536,
75 Barrie v. St. Louis Transit Co., 102 Mo. App. 87, 76 S. W. 706 (1903);
Murphy v. Wabash R. R., 228 Mo. 56, 128 S. W. 481 (1910) ; Memphis St,
By. v. Haynes, 112 Tenn. 712, 81 S. W. 374 (1904). In the Barrio cases it is
amusing to see the court saying that "there is, in this state, no such thing
as comparative negligence." 'here is some question whether or not the last
clear chance or ultimate negligence doctrine should be retained under modern
contributory negligence statutes apportioning negligence and responsibility
therefor. See Weir, Davies v. Mann and Contributory Negligcnceo Statutes
(1931) 9 CAN. BAR BEv. 4.70, where it is urged that these acts do not apply
where the defendant had the "last clear chance" to avoid the catastrophe,
despite plaintiff's contributory negligence, since the last clear chance rule
deals with causation and not with comparative negligence. The view talon
by the British Columbia Appeal Court in Morgan F. Co. v. British C. E. Ry.,
42 B. C. B. 382, 4 D. L. B. 30 (1930), that the statute obviates the necessity
of retaining this doctrine, seems better.
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followed or even understood the necessarily refined and elaborate
instructions. Moreover, the verdict must inevitably be one sided,
throwing the entire burden of loss on one party or the other.
A special verdict estimating as accurately as possible the respec-
tive delinquence of each party would be more helpful. In this
way the defendant can be made to answer in proportion to his
share of the fault. Where this is practicably impossible, the
fault could be arbitrarily apportioned half to each. This prac-
tice has been adopted by statute in several jurisdictions ", and
70 Ark. Gen. Acts of 1919, Act No. 156, Crawford and Moses Dig. § 8575
(personal injury and death actions against railroad where plaintiff's negli-
gence "of lesser degree" than defendant's) ; FLA. CoMP. LAws (1927) § 7052
(plaintiff injured by fault of self and railroad); GA. CODE (1926) § 2781
(plaintiff injured by fault of self and railroad) ; NEB. CoDIP. STAT. (1929)
§ 20-1151 (where plaintiff's negligence slight and defendant's gross); Wis.
Laws 1931, c. 242 (where plaintiff's negligence is "not as great" as defend-
ant's) ; B. C. STAT. 1925, c. 8 (all cases of mutual fault); N. B. R11v. STAT.
1927 c. 143, at 1758 (all cases of mutual fault); N. S. STAT. 1920 C. 3, at 5
(all cases of mutual fault); ONT. REV. STAT. (1927) c. 103, as amended in
ONT. STAT. 20 GEo. V c. 27 (1930) (all cases of mutual fault).
The present Ontario Statute, the most complete of any the writer has found,
applies to all negligence cases. The most important sections of this statute
are as follows: "3. In any action founded upon the fault or negligence of
two or more persons the court shall determine the degree in which each of
such persons is at fault or negligent, and where two or more persons are
found liable they shall be jointly and severally liable to the person suffering
loss or damage for such fault or negligence, but as between themselves, in
the absence of any contract express or implied, each shall be liable to make
contribution and indemnify each other in the degree in which they are re-
spectively found to be at fault or negligent.
4. In any action for damages which is founded upon the fault or negligence
of the defendant if fault or negligence is found on the part of the plaintiff
which contributed to the damages, the court shall apportion the damages in
proportion to the degree of fault or negligence found against the parties
respectively.
5. If it is not practicable to determine the respective degree of fault or
negligence as between any parties to an action, such parties shall be deemed
to be equally at fault or negligent.
6. Whenever it appears that any person not already a party to an action
is or may be wholly or partly responsible for the damages claimed, such per-
son may be added as a party defendant upon such terms as may be deemed
just.
7. In any action tried with a jury, the degree of fault or negligence of the
respective parties shall be a question of fact for the jury."
See Knowlton v. Hydro-Electric P. C., 58 Ont. L. R. S0 (1925).
Those statutes which apply only where plaintiff's negligence is less than
defendant's, are disappointing. If loss is going to be apportioned according
to fault at all, why shouldn't it be done whenever defendant has contributed,
especially since it may be found practicable in most cases to say that the
parties were equally careless.
The citations in this note do not include the statutes for the benefit of em-
ployees such as that in 45 U.S.C.A. (1928), Fed. Emp. Liab. Act § 53, where
contributory negligence is said to be no defense but reduces the damages pay-
able in proportion to the amount of fault attributable to the employee. Statu-
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its fairness and simplicity recommend its widespread sanction.
The combined contribution and apportionment devices are
ideally suited to a fair decision of the issues in type cases 3 and
4.7 In case 3 the contribution device as employed in Wisconsin
would place the burden of loss equally on the two whose conduct
had occasioned the injury to the bailor and would prevent him
from throwing the entire burden on either bailee or defendant
alone as he may do under the usual practice. The apportioning
device would allocate to each defendant that share of the ulti-
mate loss for which he was responsible. Both of these devices
are combined by legislation in the Ontario statute 71 and in con-
temporary English admiralty practice.0 And under these stat-
utes if it is practicably impossible to apportion the negligence of
the two parties, the burden is shared equally.
This scheme, however, places no risk of loss in type case 3 on
the bailor of an automobile for normal use. He may still recover
complete damages from either the third party defendant or the
bailee. If he obtains a joint judgment against both and executes
it against the third party defendant, the latter is compelled to
bear the risk of the bailee's insolvency in contribution proceed-
ings. On the other hand, the owner of an automobile harmed
by the concurrent negligence of his servant and defendant, bears
the risk of his servant's contributory negligence, whether it
means no recovery or partial recovery from the defendant. The
decisions of the bailment and employment cases are surprisingly
divergent depending on the mere chance of the driver's being a
bailee or a servant. The same probability of harm to the owner's
interest in the hands of another is present in each case. There
seems to be sound policy for treating the bailor and master alike
in these cases, and it is not at all the same policy for making
the bailor or master responsible in damages to third persons in-
jured by such conduct.
The suggested device of apportioning negligence would apply
as well to the employment and agency as to the bailment cases.
The master under such practice could recover judgment from
the defendant for his fair share of the loss, getting the balance
from his servant if he could. This suggests the risk to place on
the bailor in these cases. Instead of permitting the bailor to
recover a joint and several judgment for the entire loss against
bailee and his co-defendant, with the option of executing it
tory provisions of this type are found in Aniz. REv. CoDE (Strucenioyer,
1928) § 1388; ARK. STAT. 1916 §§ 5484, 8152; FLA. Co1xr. LAWS (1927)
§ 7060; IowA CODE (1931) § 8158; KAN. REv. STAT. (1923) § 66-238; N. C.
CODE (1931) § 3467; S. D. Coip. LAWS (1929) § 9709.
77 But see Legis. (1931) 45 HARV. L. REv. 369, 374-5.78 Statute cited and quoted in part in note 76, supra.
791 & 2 GEO. V. c. 57, §§ 1, 3, as applied in the Cairnbahn case, slip).c
note 69.
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entirely against the third party defendant, leaving him a worth-
less right of contribution against the bailee, it would seem highly
expedient to place the risk of his bailee's insolvency on the
bailor, as his share of the risk assumed when he entrusted his
property to the care of the bailee. The bailor would obtain
judgment against the third party defendant for that proportion
of the total damage which this defendant's share of the negli-
gence causing the damage bears to the aggregate of his and the
bailee's negligence. He would receive judgment for the balance
against his bailee, execution depending on the bailee's solvency.
If it is practicably impossible in a given case to apportion the
shares of negligence between bailee and his co-defendant, there
is authority for an arbitrary rule of equal responsibility.
This scheme is equally adaptable to conditional sales, chattel
mortgages and, for that matter, life estates in and mortgages of
real property. It might be stated generally as suitable in all
cases where the ownership of an interest is in one person and
the possession is in another, regardless of the owner's liability
for or immunity from damages to third persons injured by the
custodian's or possessor's careless use of the interest. This
general statement covers many situations not involving serious
hazards to the property involved. But in such cases the owner's
risk of loss is correspondingly slight.
It is more doubtful whether type cases 1, 2, and 4 could be
successfully disposed of in this manner. In case 1 it is hard to
see any justification for placing on an infant too young to be
capable of negligence, any risk of his parent's carelessness. It
is unfortunate that the defendant cannot compel the negligent
parent to contribute; but where the existing devices for contri-
bution between tortfeasors require joint liability in favor of
plaintiff against both defendants, a child's inability to hold his
parent in tort renders this impossibleso Case 4 is not open to
the same objection, since the risk of his wife's or child's negli-
gence might with some reason be placed on the plaintiff. Alloca-
tion of this risk is not as imperative as it is in case 3, however,
for the plaintiff in case 4 has less "control" over his interest. The
owner of a chattel, on the other hand, exercises his absolute
control when he voluntarily entrusts it to another. If it is
thought unwise to place this risk on the plaintiff in case 4 and
the defendant suffers adverse judgment, his right of contribution
will usually depend on the plaintiff's ability to recover a judg-
ment in tort against his wife or child. Type case 2 is more
like the bailment situation. The plaintiff voluntarily entrusts
his person to the driver for the purpose of carriage. It is not
obvious, however, that the plaintiff in this situation should
so Zutter v. O'Connell, supra note 65.
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assume the risk of the driver's carelessness. Whether he is com-
pelled to do -so or not, the third party defendant may at least
have contribution from the driver.
It is not the purpose of this article, however, to state what
risks should accompany any given circumstances or conduct.
That should be left to experts in social problems. But the com-
mon law rules of contributory negligence are obviously archaic
and the suggestions here offered may prove useful in determining
a method of administration more suited to the social needs of
the present day.
